Introduction
One of the most disputed principles of Fama (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that prices of the financial assets react instantaneous and unbiased to new information [9] . In the last decades the financial literature provided pro and contra arguments to this statement [4, 10, 11, 12, 15] .
Researches revealed various anomalies that induce doubt to EMH. Some of them are associated to the financial markets reactions to the shocks. In the field of the behavioral finance there are two main hypotheses that contest the efficient reactions to the shocks: Overreaction Hypothesis (OH) and Underreaction Hypothesis (UH). OH presumes that investors overreact to the positive shocks (usually generated by unexpected and extreme good news) and to the negative shocks (which usualy followed unexpected and extreme bad news) correcting their behavior lately [7, 8, 16] . The knowledge about these reactions could be fructified by employing contrarian strategies in which past loser stocks are bought and past winner stocks are sold [1, 13 ] .
UH presumes that investors underreact to the shocks and adjust their behavior in the next days [5, 6] . The knowledge about underreactions could be exploited by momentum strategies which consist in buying the past winner stocks and selling the past loser stocks [2, 18] .
Some empirical researches found that size of a firm could significantly influence the reactions to shocks of its stock prices [3, 17, 19] . It was also revealed that in turbulent times these reactions were different to the ones from quiet times [14] .
In this paper we investigate the reactions to shocks on the Romanian capital market. In our investigation we use daily values of eight important indexes from the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) for two periods of time: before and during the global crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as it follows: the second part describes the data and methodology employed in our investigation, the third part presents the empirical results and the fourth part concludes.
Data and Methodology
In our investigation we employ daily closing values of the main indexes from the two components of BSE: BET, where are listed all big companies, and RASDAQ, where are listed smaller firms. For BET we use five indexes: -BET, that expresses the price movement of the most liquid 10 companies listed on the BVB regulated market; -BET-C, which reflects the evolution of all the big companies listed on BSE, excepting the investment funds (SIFs); -BET-FI, that describes the price movement of the investment funds (SIFs); -BET-XT, which reflects the evolution of the most liquid 25 shares traded on the BSE, including SIFs; -BET-NG, that expresses the evolution of companies which have the main business activity located in the energy sector and the related utilities.
For RASDAQ we employ the values of three indexes:
-RASDAQ-C (RAQ-C), which describes the prices evolution of all the stocks, traded on RASDAQ market;
- where P i,t and P i,t-1 are the closing prices of index i on the days t and t-1, respectively.
We identify the positive and negative shocks using the method employed by Lasfer et al. (2003) [14] . We find that a positive shock occurs in a day t + if the following condition is satisfied:
where
r , is the return of the index i from the day t + , AVG (r i, [-60;-11] ) is the average daily returns for a period that starts 60 days before the day t + , and ends 11 days before the day t + , while STD (r i, [-60;-11] ) is the standard deviation for the same period.
We find that a negative shock occurs in a day t -if the following condition is satisfied:
r , is the return of the index i from the day t -. We separate the autonomous shocks from the positive or negative shocks we detected by excluding the successive shocks (a successive shock is one that occurs less than 10 days after an autonomous shock). In order to identify over, under and efficient reactions we compute the post-shocks abnormal returns (AR i,t ) using the formula: 
We employ for each autonomous shock, t-statistics, to test the significance of Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Based on the tests results we classify the after shock behaviours of returns into three categories: -Overreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant negative abnormal returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant positive abnormal returns;
-Underreactions, when a positive shock is followed by significant positive abnormal returns or when a negative shock is followed by significant negative abnormal returns; -Efficient reactions, when we don't find significant positive or negative abnormal returns after an autonomous shock. Table 1 and 2 present the shocks that occurred on BSE before and during the global crisis. We find that largest amounts of positive and negative shocks were for RAQ II which includes the smallest companies. In the Table 3 there are presented the cumulative abnormal returns that followed positive shocks before the global crisis. Depending on the horizon of time, the results provide arguments in favour of all the three hypotheses. For three indexes we found evidences that support UH: BET, for the second and third day, BET-C for the first fourth days and BET FI for the second day. We detect evidences in favour of OH for the second day of RAQ II. EMH cannot be rejected in the case of four indexes: BET NG, BET XT, RAQ C and RAQ I.
Empirical Results
The Table 4 presents the values of cumulative abnormal returns that followed the negative shocks before the global crisis. The results provide, for all the eight indexes, evidences in favour of EMH. Notes: t-statistic appears in parentheses; ***, **, * mean significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively In the Table 5 there are presented the cumulative abnormal returns that followed the positive shocks before the global crisis. The results provide evidences in favour of UH in the case of three indexes: BET, for third and fourth days, BET FI, for the second day, and BET XT, between the second and fourth days. All the RASDAQ indexes offered symptoms of OH: RAQ C for the second and third days, RAQ I for the tenth day and RAQ II for the first fifth days and for the tenth day. For two indexes: Bet C and BET NG, the results indicate that EMH can not be rejected.
The Table 6 presents the cumulative abnormal returns that followed the negative shocks before the global crisis. The results provide evidences in favour of OH for two indexes: BET, between the third and fifth days and BET FI between the second and the fifth days. For the rest of six indexes, the results are in favour of EMH.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the reactions to shocks of eight indexes from BSE. The results revealed some circumstances with significant influence on the reactions to shocks.
In the case of BET NG and BET XT we find no evidence in favour of UH or OH before the global crisis. This situation could be explained, in part, by the fact that two indexes were introduced in 2007 so the period of analysis was shorter in comparison with the other indexes. However, we also cannot reject EMH for BET NG reactions during the global crisis. This situation could be linked to the fact that circumstances which caused shocks in the Romanian energy sector during the both periods were very heterogeneous.
For the positive shocks from the two periods of time we found underreactions only for BET market, while the overreactions occurred only for RASDAQ market. These results could be explained by the size effect: in the case of small firms stocks from RASDAQ investors' expectations were more optimistic in comparison with the big companies stocks from BET. For the RASDAQ indexes the overreactions were more consistent during the global crisis than before it.
We identified only efficient reactions to the negative shocks before the global crisis. In this period BSE experienced an ascendant trend and the negative shocks were caused by heterogeneous events. During the global crisis we found overreactions on BET market. This
